

Access Control Methodologies

Chapter 2

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Overview

- Basic Principles
- Controls
- Access Control Designs
- Access Control Administration
- Accountability
- Access Control Models
- Identification and Authentication Methods
- Single Sign-On Systems
- File and Data Ownership
- Attacks

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Basics of Access Control

- Access control is a collection of methods and components
 - Supports **confidentiality** (protects information from unauthorized disclosure)
 - Supports **integrity** (protects information from unauthorized modification)
- Goal: to allow only **authorized subjects** to access **permitted objects**

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Access Control Basics (cont'd)

- Subject
 - The entity that requests access to a resource
 - Active
- Object
 - The resource a subject attempts to access
 - Passive

How do we partition subjects / objects for efficient management?

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Access Control Basics (cont'd)

- **Least secure philosophy** (permissive policy)
 - Any object access not prohibited is granted by default.
 - Ineffective maintenance leads to **authorization creep**
- **Least privilege philosophy** (prohibitive policy)
 - A subject is granted permissions needed to accomplish required tasks and nothing more

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Controls

- **Mechanisms** put into place to allow or disallow object access
 - Any potential barrier to unauthorized access
 - Locks, guards, passwords...
- Controls organized into different categories
- Common **categories**
 - **Administrative** (enforce security rules through policies, ex. procedures, usage monitoring, security training)
 - **Logical/Technical** (implement object access restrictions, ex. identification / authentication / segregated network)
 - **Physical** (limit physical access to hardware)

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Access Control Techniques

- Choose techniques that fit the organization's needs
- Considerations include
 - **Level of security** required
 - **Environmental impact** of security measures
 - **User convenience**
- Techniques differ in
 - The way objects and subjects are identified
 - How decisions are made to approve or deny access

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Access Control Designs

- Access control designs define **rules** for users accessing files or devices
- Three common access control designs
 - **Mandatory** access control (MAC)
 - **Discretionary** access control (DAC)
 - **Non-discretionary** access control

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Mandatory Access Control

- A unified (mandatory) way to assign a security label to each subject and object in a system.
- Matches label of subject to label of object to determine when access should be granted
- A common implementation is rule-based access control
 - Often requires a subject to have a need to know in addition to proper security clearance
 - Need to know indicates that a subject requires access to object to complete a particular task
 - Example rule:
subject's security clearance > object's security label

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MAC (cont'd)

- Common military data classifications
 - Unclassified
 - Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
 - Confidential
 - Secret
 - Top Secret
- Common commercial data classifications
 - Public
 - Sensitive
 - Private
 - Confidential

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Discretionary Access Control

- Access to an object is defined by the object owner.
- Uses identity of subject to decide when to grant an access request
- Most common design in commercial operating systems
 - Generally less secure than mandatory control
 - Generally easier to implement and more flexible
- Includes
 - Identity-based access control: ex. UNIX file permission
 - Access control lists (ACLs): ex. WINNT
allows group of objects / subjects to be controlled together

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Non-discretionary Access Control

- Uses a subject's role or a task assigned to subject to grant or deny object access
 - Also called role-based or task-based access control
- Works well in environments with high turnover of subjects since access is not tied directly to subject
- Lattice-based control is a variation of non-discretionary control
 - Relationship between subject and object has a set of access boundaries that define rules and conditions for access

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Access Control Administration

- Can be implemented as **centralized**, **decentralized**, or **hybrid**
- **Centralized** access control administration
 - All requests go through a **central authority**
 - Administration is relatively **simple**
 - **Single point of failure**, sometimes **performance bottlenecks**
 - Common packages include Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (**RADIUS**), Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (**CHAP**), Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (**TACACS**)

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Access Control Administration (cont'd)

- **Decentralized** access control administration
 - Object access is **controlled locally** rather than centrally
 - More **difficult** administration
 - Objects may need to be secured at multiple locations
 - More **stable and robust**
 - Not a single point of failure
 - Usually implemented using **security domains**

A **security domain** is a *sphere of trust*, including a collection of subjects and objects with defined access rules or permissions

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Accountability

- System auditing used by administrators to monitor
 - **Who is using the system**
 - **What users are doing**
- Logs can trace events back to originating users
- Process of auditing can have a negative effect on system **performance**
 - Must limit data collected in logs
 - **Clipping levels** set thresholds for when to start collecting data

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
Access Control Models

- Provide **conceptual view** of **security policies**
- Map **goals and directives** to specific system events
- Provide a **formal definition and specification** of required security controls
- Usually many different models and combinations of models are used in a secure system

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State Machine Model

- A collection of defined **states** and **transitions**
- Modifications change objects from one state to another
- A **state** represents the characteristics of an object at a point in time
- **Transitions** represent the modifications that can be made to objects to change from one state to another



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State Machine Model (cont'd)




Figure 2.1 Simple state machine

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Bell-LaPadula Model

- 1970s by US military
- Focus on **confidentiality**
- A **state machine** model that uses *security labels*
- Each **object** is given a **security level** and each **subject** is given a **security clearance**
- Two basic properties to *evaluate access requests*
 - Simple security rule: **no read up**
 - *-property: **no write down**

1. Top Secret
2. Secret
3. Confidential
4. Sensitive but Unclassified
5. Unclassified

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Biba Model

- After Bell-LaPadula
- Focuses on **integrity controls**
- A **state machine** model that uses *integrity labels*
- Each **object** or subject is given an **integrity level**
- Two basic properties to *evaluate access requests*
 - Simple integrity property: **no read down**
 - *-property: **no write up**
- Popular with **businesses** because its main focus is to ensure that unauthorized subjects cannot change objects

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Clark-Wilson Model

- Developed after the Biba model
- Not a state machine model
- Restricts all accesses to a small number of tightly controlled **access programs**
 - **Integrity verification procedure (IVP)**: verifies the integrity of a data item
 - **Transformation procedure (TP)**: makes authorized changes to a data item
 - After subject is properly **authenticated** and **cleared to access** the object, all modifications are first validated by the **IVP**, and then the modification takes place by the **TP**.
- Works well in **commercial applications**

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Non-interference Model

- Often an **addition to other models**
- Ensures that changes at one security level **do not bleed over into other levels**
- Maintains both **data integrity and confidentiality**

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Identification and Authentication Methods

- **Two-factor authentication** uses two phases
 - **Identification**: a subject claims to be a specific entity by presenting identifying credentials
 - **Authentication**: verifies that the subject really is who she claims to be
- Usually there will be an **authorization** phase followed by successful authentication where system evaluates the specific rights or permissions for the subject

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Identification and Authentication Methods (cont'd)

- Security practices often require input from multiple categories of authentication techniques
 - **What you know**:
 - Password, passphrase, PIN, lock combination
 - **What you have**:
 - Smartcard, token device
 - **What you are**: Biometrics
 - fingerprint, palm print, hand geometry, retina / iris pattern, voice pattern, signature, keyboard dynamics

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
Identification and Authentication Methods (cont'd)

- Strong password policy
 - At least six characters in length
 - Contain at least one number or punctuation characters
 - Do not use dictionary words or combinations of dictionary words
 - Do not use common personal data, such as birth date, social security number, family member or pet name, or favorite song or hobby
 - Never write down your password or send it as clear text
 - Do not use key mapping of MBCS input methods (Chang-Jie, Da-I, Ju-In, BoShaMe, ...)
- Try to make your password **easy to remember** but **hard to guess**

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Identification and Authentication Methods (cont'd)

- **Biometrics**: detection and classification of a subject's **physical attributes**
 - most complex authentication mechanism
 - most difficult to fake
 - most expensive to implement
 - most difficult to maintain
- Imperfect nature of biometrics analysis
 - False rejection rate (FRR)
 - False acceptance rate (FAR)
 - Crossover error rate (CER)



Single Sign-On

- Used to **avoid multiple logins**
- Once a subject is positively identified, authentication information can be used within a trusted group
- Great for users in a LAN environment since they can **sign on once** and **use multiple resources**
- Requires **additional works** for administrators
- Several good SSO systems in use, **Kerberos** is one example

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Kerberos

- Uses **symmetric key cryptography** for messages
- Provides end-to-end security through authentication and key exchange protocol
 - Intermediate machines between the source and target cannot read contents of messages
- Used in **distributed environments** but implemented with **centralized servers**
- Includes an **authentication server** and a **ticket-granting server**
- Weaknesses include
 - **Single point of failure**, performance bottleneck
 - **Session key** lives on client machines for a small amount of time, can be stolen

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File and Data Ownership

- Different layers of responsibility for ensuring security of organization's information
- Data owner
 - Bears ultimate responsibility, sets classification levels, delegate day-to-day responsibility of maintenance to the data custodian
- Data custodian
 - Enforces security policies, often a member of IT department. Maintains appropriate controls, taking backups, and validating the integrity of the data
- Data user
 - Accesses data on a day-to-day basis, responsible for following the organization's security policies

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Related Attacks

- Brute force attack
 - Try all possible combinations of characters to satisfy Type 1 authentication (password guessing)
 - War dialing
- Dictionary attack
 - Subset of brute force attack
 - Instead of all possible combinations, try common passwords from a list, or a dictionary
- Spoofing attack
 - Create fake login program, prompt for User ID, password
 - Return login failure message, store captured information
- Social engineering attack

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Summary

- Use access control to ensure that only authorized users can view/modify information
- Access control designs define rules for accessing objects
 - Mandatory, discretionary, non-discretionary
- Access control administration defines the mechanisms for access control implementation
 - Centralized, decentralized, hybrid
- Administrators use system logs to monitor access

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Summary (cont'd)

- Access control models
 - Provide a conceptual view of security policies
 - One common example is the state machine model
- Identification and authentication methods
 - Used to identify and validate a user
 - Include passwords, smart cards, and biometrics
 - Single sign-on systems allow trusted groups to share authenticators and authorizations (e.g., Kerberos)

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Summary (cont'd)

- Responsibility for information access is shared
 - Data owners, custodians, users
- Attack types related to access controls include
 - Brute force attacks, dictionary attacks, login spoofing

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Assignments

- Reading: Chapter 2
- Practice 2.11 Challenge Questions
- Next week, turn in Challenge Exercise 2.3 and the following question
- Write down an access control policy for protecting personnel records in a business. Should employees be able to access their own records? Other people's records? Should managers be able to access all records? Come up with a consistent policy. Try to build a state machine model to describe this policy.

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