## 1071 Cryptography Homework \#2 Due 10/30

1. Let $a$ and $n>1$ be integers with $\operatorname{gcd}(a, n)=1$. The order of $a(\bmod n), \operatorname{or} d_{n}(a)$, is the smallest positive integer $r$ such that $a^{r} \equiv 1(\bmod n)$.
(a) Show that $r \leq \phi(n)$.
(b) Show that if $m=r k$ is a multiple of $r$, then $a^{m} \equiv 1(\bmod n)$.
(c) If $a^{t} \equiv 1(\bmod n)$, where $t=q r+s$ with $0 \leq s<r$, show that $a^{s} \equiv 1(\bmod n)$. Also, show that the definition of $r$ implies that $s=0$ and thus $r \mid t$.
(d) Show that $\operatorname{ord}_{n}(a) \mid \phi(n)$.
(e) Show that any prime order group $\mathbf{G}$ (not necessarily a group of integers) is indeed cyclic.
2. (a) Show that if $\operatorname{gcd}(\mathrm{e}, 24)=1$, then $e^{2} \equiv 1(\bmod 24)$.
(b) Show that if $\mathrm{n}=35$ is used as an RSA modulus, then the encryption exponent e always equals the decryption exponent d.
3. Suppose that there are two users in a network. Let their RSA moduli be $n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$, with $n_{1}$ not equal to $n_{2}$. If you are told that $n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$ are not relatively prime, how would you break their schemes? (In Asiacrypt 2013, the paper "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards: Coppersmith in the wild" showed that there is a devastated security loophole in Taiwan's "Citizen Digital Certificate".)
4. Show that the quotients in the Euclidean algorithm for $\operatorname{gcd}(a, b)$ are exactly the numbers $a_{0}, a_{1}, \ldots$ that appear in the continued fraction of $\frac{a}{b}$.
5. In order to increase security, Bob chooses $n$ and two encryption exponents $e_{1}, e_{2}$. He asks Alice to encrypt her message $m$ to him by first computing $c_{1}=m^{e_{1}}(\bmod n)$, then encrypting $c_{1}$ to get $c_{2}=c_{1}{ }^{e_{2}}(\bmod n)$. Alice then sends $c_{2}$ to Bob. Does this double encryption increase security over single encryption? Why or why not?
